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The White Papers " ... From the Sea" and "Forward ... From the Sea" have shifted 
the focus of U.S. maritime strategy from open-ocean (blue-water) operations to near-land 
(littoral) operations. U.S. naval strength lies in the capability to conduct sustained 
operations on the high seas, but the littoral environment and the potential enemy which 
may be encountered there impose new demands on our naval forces. It is imprudent to 
assume that the U.S. Navy can transfer their open-ocean proficiency into the littoral 
unmodified. This thesis evaluates the U.S. Navy's ability to conduct operations within 
this environment through its Littoral Warfare tactics, doctrine, and training. Then 
corrective actions for building littoral tactics and doctrine are recommended. It is 
intended that the recommendations will initiate a tactical debate to better prepare U.S. 
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EXECUTfVESU~RY 
The White Papers " ... From the Sea'' and "Forward ... From the Sea" outline clearly 
the vision and strategy the U.S. Navy will carry into the 2P1Century. They specify the 
continuance of several naval roles and missions such as sea control and maritime 
supremacy, but also call for readiness to conduct naval operations in littoral regions all 
around the world. 
The littoral environment and the potential enemy which may be encountered there 
impose new demands on U.S. naval forces. Geographical constraints, limited battlespace, 
reduced reaction time to incoming threats, the lethality of enemy weapons, ambiguous 
threat bearings, clutter, congestion, uncertainty, restrictive ROEs, unrealistic and 
unattainable states of readiness, and the eventual degradation of weapon and sensor 
performance equate to greater vulnerabilities for naval forces which operate within these 
areas than in the open ocean. 
The U.S. Navy is without question the strongest in the world. No other nation, at 
least in the foreseeable future, can challenge its ability to maintain sea control or threaten 
its maritime superiority. However, given the intricacies of the littoral environment, the 
fact that U.S. warships, aircraft, and submarines are designed and its personnel trained for 
operations on the high seas, it is imprudent to suppose that these seagoing forces can turn 
their open ocean proficiency to advantage in this setting. 
Research and development programs are underway to enhance the capabilities of 
future naval forces for littoral warfare. These programs could be years away from 
fruition. Should the Navy be called upon to enter battle close to shore in the near future, 
we must be able to fight with what we have now. The Navy will fight as well or as 
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poorly as we are prepared, and that is highly dependent on current tactics, doctrine, and 
training. 
Tactics and doctrine serve to enhance cohesion, mutual understanding, and 
support, thereby creating the potential to achieve prompt and harmonious action among 
forces in battle. Given the complexities, limited battlespace, and reduced reaction time 
within the littoral environment, having the right tactics is extremely important. With 
sound tactics and doctrine, training arid exercises develop skills and instincts required for 
combat. However, examination of the tactics, doctrine, and training which pertain to 
Littoral Warfare indicate that they are clearly lagging within the U.S. Navy Surface Fleet. 
In order to train and gain proficiency in operations to control littoral areas and 
support land operations from the sea, the Navy must develop the tactics first. With broad 
acceptance, the tactics can be recorded and promulgated in written tactical doctrine which 
will ultimately produce unified effort among naval surface forces. The tactics may then 
be evaluated, refined, and practiced until they are second nature. 
The recommendations of Chapter VI indicate the kind of fundamental tactical 
core that should serve as the basis for specific signals, formations, firing plans, Electronic 
Warfare procedures and other guidance that might form an inshore annex to ATP-1. It is 
hoped that the recommendations will initiate a tactical debate to better prepare naval 
forces for operations near land. These recommendations are: 
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• Ensure there is a shared belief throughout the Navy that future conflict will take place 
under the constraints of the littoral environment. 
• The belief that blue water proficiency can be carried unmodified into littoral regions 
is uninformed and baseless. 
• Within the littoral environment, it would be best for the U.S. Navy to revert to the 
tactics of World War II in which forces operate in close mutual defensive support 
while at the same time maintain the capability to deliver precision offensive 
firepower. 
• Surface formations must be tightened. 
• Establish free-fire zones and procedures. 
• Establish defensive support tactics for warships engaged in operations in support of 
activities on land. 
• Maintain minimum formation speed of at least 1 0 knots. 
• Adapt Electronic Warfare procedures for inshore operations. 
• Surface screening forces must perform tasks in an ambiguous tactical environment 
under risky conditions. 
• Shallow water ASW proficiency will be essential. Active acoustic search will be 
necessary and requires quite different tactics, formations, and means of prosecuting 
contacts. Airborne assets are preferred over seaborne assets, but require 
unaccustomed patience and use of non-acoustic means for detection. 
• Command structure and Rules of Engagement for operations within the littoral 
environment require review. 
• Responses to the threat of weapons of mass destruction must be formulated. 
• Tactical coordination is required to clear minefields covered by enemy fire. 
• To effectively operate in the littoral, the U.S. Navy must conduct its training in it. 
Exercises must be conducted in the most congested environment possible. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE OF THESIS 
This thesis serves to illustrate the kind of fundamental tactical core needed as the 
basis for naval operations in a littoral environment. It is hoped that it will initiate a 
tactical debate to better prepare naval forces for operations near land. 
B. SOURCE OF INTEREST IN TOPIC 
In 1992, the author had the unique opportunity to spend two days at sea aboard 
one of several Bahraini Coastal Patrol Craft during training exercises with the U.S. Navy. 
He was intrigued by their efficient coordination, high speed maneuvers, knowledge of the 
surrounding waters and environment, and the quality of their weapons and sensors. 
During daylight hours they anchored, camouflaged themselves among rocks, and waited 
till sunset to begin their maneuvers. Under the cover of darkness, they began their search 
for the U.S. warship. Keenly aware of the shipping lanes and fish havens, they cleverly 
blended in with merchant shipping and fishing boats. They communicated with flashing 
light and designated only one patrol craft to illuminate his surface-search radar randomly 
for seconds at a time. It was not difficult to locate the U.S. warship with passive 
Electronic Support Measures (ESM). The U.S. warship was radiating her air-search radar 
to track and control her scouting helicopter for safety of flight, and continuously operated 
her surface-search radar for navigational purposes and to avoid shipping. Once detected, 
the Bahrainis easily executed a simulated attack. The U.S. warship was unaware of their 
presence until it was too late. 
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Additionally, in 1994, the author participated in coastal warfare exercises with the 
Israeli and Tunisian Navies. The patrol craft of these navies operated with proficiency 
and could not be located nor identified in the congested waters off the coast as well. 
Once again, several successful simulated engagements were conducted against the U.S. 
warship. 
The efficiency displayed by the patrol craft of three foreign navies and the poor 
performance of the author's warship was alarming and raised serious concerns regarding 
the U.S. NaVy's ability to effectively conduct littoral operations in support of" ... From the 
Sea" and "Forward ... From the Sea." 
C. BACKGROUND 
The fall of the Soviet Union has fundamentally altered the international security 
environment. As a result, the world is more complex and uncertain with many and varied 
emerging threats. The White Papers " ... From the Sea" and "Forward ... From the Sea" 
provide the vision and strategy the U.S. Navy will carry into the 2P1Century to meet 
these threats. They specify the continuance of several naval roles and missions, such as 
maritime supremacy, but also call for readiness to conduct naval operations in littoral 
regions all around the world. 
Maritime supremacy - the ability to maintain control of the high seas for military 
and economic purposes- is where U.S. naval strength lies. No other nation, at least in the 
foreseeable future, can deny its ability to transport troops, equipment, and goods by sea . 
. 
However, the littoral environment and the potential enemy which may be encountered 
there impose new demands on U.S. naval forces. 
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It is possible to influence events in these regions by projecting power over littoral 
waters with the use of carrier based aircraft and land attack cruise missiles, thus avoiding 
the need to operate in them. However, if logistic support from the sea is required to 
sustain a land campaign, or if amphibious forces are required to conduct a landing, naval 
forces must transit and operate within the littoral. 
Naval operations near land are best described as warfare in confined waters. 
Coastal waters are not only where the enemy will contest our control, but where he has 
advantages of congestion and limited battlespace [Ref. 1]. Warships which operate in 
this complex environment will see that their warning and reaction time have been reduced 
significantly, their ability to maneuver has become extremely difficult by virtue of the 
shallow water and the always present mine threat, and lastly, classification and 
deconfliction are crucial given the abundance of aircraft and shipping. This is an 
environment the U.S. Navy is not yet prepared to overcome. 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
The author has attempted to isolate the case of the surface ship in the littoral 
arena. The author acknowledges that by doing so, there is an apparent risk of 
oversimplifying the difficulties which aircraft and submarines face in their attempts to 
control the littoral area and support land operations from the sea. Nonetheless, the 
argument for the development and implementation of sound tactical, doctrinal, and 
training development to meet the challenges imposed by the littoral environment can and 
should be extended to warfare communities other than the Surface Warfare Community. 
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E. ASSUMPTIONS 
It is recognized that many research and development programs are underway to 
enhance the capabilities of future naval forces for littoral warfare. These programs could 
be years away from fruition. The recommendations of this thesis are based on the 
premise that the U.S. Navy must be able to fight and win with forces at its disposal in a 
battle of the near future. 
A distinction must be made with regard to coastal states. Some may be poor, 
badly governed, and ill-equipped for naval operations while others are quite capable. In 
the Middle East and Eastern Asia- regions which are vital to U.S. national interests and 
possess the potential for future conflicts - several coastal states are capable of conducting 
highly professional naval operations. For the purposes of this thesis, coastal states with 
competent coastal navies are assumed. 
F. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS 
1. Chapter II. Shift in U.S. Maritime Strategy 
This chapter will promote a shared understanding throughout the Surface Navy of 
how and why the vision and strategy set forth in the White Papers" ... From the Sea" and 
"Forward ... From the Sea" shifted the focus ofU.S. Maritime Strategy from open-ocean 
(blue-water) operations to near land (littoral) operations. 
2. Chapter III. The Littoral Environment and the Enemy 
This chapter will convey the message that it is imprudent to assume U.S. naval 
forces can transfer their open-ocean proficiency into the littoral arena unmodified. This 
will be accomplished by describing in detail the difficulties of operating in this 
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environment and by illustrating the competence of potential enemy coastal navies 
throughout the world. 
3. Chapter IV. The Importance of Tactics, Doctrine, and Training for 
Command and Control 
This chapter will lay the foundation from which the remainder of the thesis is 
based - that sound and effective tactics, doctrine, and training combine to prepare forces 
which are capable of conducting nearly automatic, harmonious, and coordinated action 
under the constant pressure and stress of hostilities. Hence, the evaluation of tactics, 
doctrine, and training will reveal whether or not a force is prepared for battle. 
4. Chapter V. Evaluation of U.S. Navy Tactics, Doctrine, and Training 
for Littoral Warfare 
This chapter will evaluate how well the U.S. Surface Navy is prepared to conduct 
littoral operations by reviewing its tactics, doctrine and training. 
5. Chapter VI. Building Effective Littoral Warfare Tactics, Doctrine, 
and Training 
This chapter will serve two purposes: the first, to provide a framework or 
paradigm of how the U.S. Navy might go about developing the tactics, doctrine and 
training required to support the maritime strategy expressed in" ... From the Sea"; and 
second, to recommend actions for implementing such development. 
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II. SHIFT IN U.S. MARITIME STRATEGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The White Papers " ... From the Sea" and "Forward ... From the Sea" shifted the 
focus of U.S. Maritime Strategy from open-ocean (blue-water) operations to emphasize 
near land (littoral) operations. Both documents outline clearly the vision and strategy that 
the U.S. Navy will carry into the 2P1Century. How and why the vision evolved will be 
discussed in order to promote a shared understanding among those who will support and 
implement this strategy. 
B. BACKGROUND 
U.S. Maritime Strategy is derived from objectives and guidance established in 
U.S. National Security Strategy and U.S. National Military Strategy. Its aim is to provide 
a framework from which planning and decisions regarding naval roles, missions and 
force structures are formulated. [Ref. 2] 
Maritime Strategy during the Cold War, and for that matter National Security and 
Military Strategy, dealt primarily with the Soviet threat. The objective of this strategy 
was to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining dominance over Europe and Asia. Despite 
the Cold War tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, the security 
environment during this era was generally stable and predictable. In other words, the 
bipolar superpower competition somewhat paradoxically helped to maintain the status 
quo and balance of power in other regions throughout the world. [Ref. 3] 
Events to the end of 1991 fundamentally altered the international security 
environment. The Soviet Union collapsed. The Cold War, which so dominated world 
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politics for almost a half century, was over. So too, however, was the stability it provided 
[Ref. 3]. The world now faces a period where the only certainty is uncertainty and 
change [Ref. 4 ]. 
The international security environment is complex, ambiguous, and turbulent. 
Complicating the issue is the reemergence of several "roots of conflict" such as intra-
nationalism - among ethnic, religious, and social groups inside states - demographic or 
population expansion, and resource competition, which have led to 4'tstability and 
regional disputes previously held in check by Communism and the Cold War competition 
alluded to above [Ref. 5]. Dr. Edward L. Warner III, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Strategy and Requirements, notes that the danger posed by the Soviet Union during the 
last half century presented policy makers with focus and direction for their strategy to 
confront this threat. The fall of the Soviet Union, however, has changed things and thus 
forced the United States to rethink its policies [Ref. 6]. 
In The Prince Machiavelli wrote that, ''there is nothing more difficult to carry out, 
nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order 
of things ... " [Ref 7] Four centuries later, this statement couldn't be more true. In light of 
these changes to the international security environment new questions arose regarding 
U.S. priorities and strategy. In particular the question: "What are America's national 
interests and how might they be threatened?" took center stage. What emerged was a 
focus primarily centered on regional challenges, opportunities, and instability, where 
change is widespread and unpredictable [Ref 8]. 
After the National Security Strategy was refocused, the National Military Strategy 
followed suit. It soon became quite clear that this shift in policy would have profound 
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implications for the Navy and Marine Corps. Direction and coherent strategy for the 
future were thus required for the development of policy and programs pertaining to 
doctrine, training and education, force structure, acquisition, and the allocation of 
resources. Thus the impetus for the new Maritime Strategy. 
In late 1991, then Secretary of the Navy H.L. Garrett III realized that the dynamic 
and uncertain security environment required naval forces which were flexible to meet the 
many and varied emerging threats. Tliis, however, presented somewhat of a catch-22, 
because planning for uncertainty requires flexibility, which is invariably costly, despite a 
shrinking military budget and force structure. Therefore, a prudent and sound direction 
for the Navy was required to meet the needs of the future within the constraints imposed 
by cuts in defense spending. [Ref. 9] 
A directive aimed at creating such direction was issued by the Secretary of the 
Navy to the Chief ofNaval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps on 20 
November 1991. It ordered the development of a new strategic concept to assess U.S. 
naval requirements for the next century. The Secretary's instructions further emphasized 
that efforts were to go beyond the short term ramifications of the then-impending Soviet 
collapse. A long view, fifteen to twenty years forward, was required. [Ref. 10] 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT 
1. Naval Forces Capabilities Planning Effort 
In response to Secretary Garrett's directive, a forum called the "Naval Forces 
Capabilities Planning Effort" (NFCPE) was established to develop the strategic concept. 
The working group began with two fundamental assumptions: first, naval forces, owing 
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to their inherent ability to respond swiftly with credible power to crises throughout the 
world, would continue to implement national policy when required; and second, the 
United States, clearly superior to other power centers throughout the world, would 
continue to maintain a leadership role in the world. These assumptions established the 
need for naval forces with the ability to sustain long-term operations in far off locations. 
[Ref. 11] 
Next the group set out to identify, from the many and varied changes in the 
international security environment, which changes would have the most pronounced 
impact on future naval requirements. In other words, why would U.S. naval forces be 
called into action and how would they conduct operations differently in the future? Their 
findings are central to this thesis. 
a. Trends That Point to Regional Instability 
(1) Weapons Proliferation. Despite the collapse ofthe Soviet 
Union, its nuclear stockpile still existed in the hands of Russia and other successor states. 
It was estimated that by the end of the century, perhaps up to a dozen Third World 
nations could actually possess or have the knowledge to develop weapons of mass 
destruction- nuclear, biological, and chemical. Additionally, the prospect that these 
nations might use these types of weapons seemed more likely after Desert Storm where 
the might of U.S. conventional power was displayed. The presumed stability of "mutual 
assured destruction" during the Cold War, by which thousands of U.S. and USSR 
warheads were tightly controlled with little likelihood of their use, could not be 
guaranteed. This therefore implied a broadened scope of deterrence - from an emphasis 
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on deterring global thermonuclear war to a more complex objective of also deterring 
regional crises and conflicts. [Ref. 11] 
(2) Global Economic Interdependence. The world had witnessed 
dramatic changes which led to significant effects upon world economies. Deregulation of 
domestic financial markets, international trade agreements, trans-national business 
enterprises, and expanded capital flows, coupled with the emergence of powerful 
computers, networks, and telecommunications, created an interdependent world economy 
[Ref. 12]. The working group focused on the role naval forces would play in protecting 
U.S. economic interests into the 21 51 Century. 
It was widely believed within the group that a stable global 
environment ensured peaceful economic growth - which would be essential to the long-
term welfare of the United States. Conversely, it was understood that crisis and 
instability throughout the world could make the U.S. economy vulnerable. Therefore, 
"the linkage between economic interests and a stabilizing security strategy indicated that 
the traditional missions of crisis deterrence and response would take on a new economic 
significance ... " [Ref. 11] In a nutshell, U.S. access to foreign resources and markets was 
to be ensured, not only in times ofwar, but in times of peace. 
Attempts by the working group to identify and list critical 
economic interests for contingency planning were unsuccessful. Economic 
interdependence implied complexity. It was not possible to predict where or for what 
economic interests the U.S. would be compelled to use military force, nor could it be 
determined at what level that force might have to be used. Given its inability to forecast 
such crises, the group concluded that the naval service had to be able to deal with a broad 
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scale of conflicts throughout the world rather than prepare for contingencies in specific 
locations, and that the naval services would continue emphasis on overseas presence to 
foster political and economic stability. 
(3) Accelerating Pace of Technological Change. The NFCPE 
believed strongly that planning fot future naval capabilities had to address the 
accelerating rate of global technological change. It was impossible to predict exactly how 
these changes would alter the nature of warfare. However, it was noted that there were 
three areas of technological progress which created such potential: the advancement of 
information systems which enhance the ability to gather, process, and disseminate 
information about the enemy; dramatic improvements in the range, accuracy, and 
lethality of conventional weapons; and, the development of advanced computer 
simulation techniques used to train forces and aid in new operational concepts [Ref. 13]. 
Advancements in these areas were observed in both the military 
and civilian sectors, as opposed to the Cold War Era, when these sectors were largely 
separate. This, the group believed, would lead to dramatic consequences: first, the 
lengthy and ponderous acquisition process of the military sector would not be expeditious 
enough to exploit the technical advances; and second, the acquisition of "off-the-shelf' 
civilian technology could allow other nations to obtain military capabilities without the 
expense of costly research and development. 
b. Maritime Issues 
Up to this point the group had identified the changes which had occurred 
to the international security environment following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 
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order to fully develop the new strategic concept, the group next focused on maritime 
issues. The following were noted. 
(1) Roots of Conflict in Coastal Areas. "Roots of conflict," such 
as intra-nationalism, demographic expansion, and resource competition, were 
concentrated in regions near coastal areas and chokepoints throughout the world. It was 
observed that: 70 percent of the world's population lives within two hundred miles of the 
sea; 80 percent of the world's capitals lie within three hundred miles of the sea; and 99 
percent (by weight) ofU.S. exports travel on the seas, with many of the important 
chokepoints controlled by states in crisis. [Ref. 14] 
(2) 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea. Throughout the 
twentieth century, the value of ocean resources have increased as they have become more 
scarce. This fact, coupled with technological advances, has prompted coastal nations to 
lay claim to resources beyond their lawful jurisdiction. As a result, the world community 
has tried to establish rules to govern ocean uses. The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law 
of the Sea was convened to seek a legal framework for governing the uses of the seas, the 
rights and obligations of states, and the extent of jurisdiction that states may exercise 
offshore. [Ref. 15] 
The Convention of the Law of the Sea significantly increased the 
importance of nations situated along coastal regions throughout'the world. Each gained 
increased authority in its territorial seas (out to 12 nautical miles) and jurisdiction in its 
exclusive economic zones (out to 200 miles) and continental shelf [Ref. 15]. These states 
determined the allowable catch of resources in their economic zones and were granted 
exclusive rights for exploring for and exploiting natural resources on their own 
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continental shelf. In the eyes of the NFCPE, coastal regions were important in strategic 
economic and political terms [Ref. 11]. 
c. Naval Forces Influence Events On Land 
The regional instability and the maritime issues suggested that naval 
forces would increasingly be tasked to respond to crises throughout the world in close 
proximity to land. The NFCPE requested that the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 
conduct a study of U.S. naval involvement in crises following World War II to gauge past 
performance ·against possible future requirements. The analysis found that there were 325 
instances where U.S. military forces responded to crises. Among them, 83 percent 
included naval forces, and about half the responses were entirely naval in composition. 
The NFCPE thus came to an extremely important determination: first, naval forces will 
certainly be called upon to counter various threats, and secondly, they can and will 
influence events not only at sea, but also, on land. [Ref. 11] 
d. Potential Areas Where Conflict May Occur 
The next logical step was projecting where and against whom the potential 
for future conflict might occur. Although it was impossible to accurately forecast where 
future crises would occur, it was feasible to identify nations which would have the 
potential to pose a threat to the United States in various regions throughout the world. 
This was accomplished by analyzing demographic and economic trends, educational 
infrastructures, and the technological and industrial bases of all nations. From this 
evaluation, the group was able to appraise the strengths and weaknesses of these nations 
as well as discern what their military potential might be, should a crisis arise. These 
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nations were then grouped by geographical regions throughout the world to support 
judgments about the potential for volatility in the future security environment. 
The working group concluded that two regions, the Middle East and 
Eastern Asia, possessed the greatest potential for future conflict. This was based on the 
number of nations within each regions which had the potential to equip and maintain 
large-scale forces with modem technologically advanced weapons. Additionally, these 
regions were most likely to be affected by the aforementioned trends which may lead to 
regional insecurity - access to weapons of mass destruction through proliferation, 
increased economic significance (mainly because of oil in the Middle East and 
opportunities which exist due to the emerging markets in Eastern Asia) and technical 
advancements through proliferation. [Ref. 11] 
e. Coalition Building 
The NFCPE believed that alliances last as long as the threat existed which 
led to their creation. The fall of the Soviet Union prompted the question - what was to 
become of the alliances created to match the Soviet threat, particularly the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO)? 
The Gulf War was fought by a coalition of forces temporarily aligned to 
meet a single transitory threat. NATO members involved in the coalition were able to 
work together effectively based on the interoperability developed during the Cold War. 
However, what if the United States required a coalition of forces focused outside 
NATO's interests? What would the United States do ifNATO disbanded? Without an 
historical alliance relationship, including over forty years of experience and efforts to 
improve interoperability, how could future coalitions be formed to operate successfully? 
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The working group concluded that the essential elements of cooperation 
and interoperability - mainly gained through exercises - must be in place before a 
coalition became necessary. Long term interaction with potential partners would 
therefore be necessary. However, with decreasing budgets and a decline in overseas 
bases, the long term preparatory presence and interaction would have to fall increasingly 
-
in the hands of naval forces deployed to areas of strategic importance. 
f. Conclusions of the NFCPE 
The NFCPE concluded that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
resulting changes in the international security environment would lead to two significant 
consequences for naval forces as they prepared to enter the 21st Century: 
• Naval forces would not only need to maintain operational proficiency 
for sea control and maritime supremacy, but also require capabilities to effectively 
conduct operations in a littoral environment. 
• A renewed emphasis on overseas presence within littoral regions would 
be required, due not only to decreasing budgets and a decline in overseas bases 
but also, due to the necessity to ensure access to foreign resources and markets in 
an interdependent global economy. 
In essence, the group concluded that operations in the littoral entail the 
ability to enter and dominate the waters and airspace of another nation [Ref. 16]. With 
an emphasis on joint operations and capabilities following the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols 
Act, this also translated into providing support for operations ashore either logistically or 
with power projection [Ref. 17]. 
2. " ... From the Sea" and "Forward ... From the Sea" 
The end product of the Naval Forces Capabilities Planning Effort was the White 
Paper titled, " ... From the Sea." It provided a simple, direct, and concise vision which 
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articulated the scope and capability of the naval services as they prepared to enter the 21st 
Century. This vision was subsequently updated and expanded in "Forward ... From the 
Sea" in October 1994. The strategic concept in these two documents provide for the 
development of policy and programs pertaining to doctrine, training and education, force 
structure, acquisition, and the allocation of resources. Although the concept specified the 
continuance of several naval roles and missions, it also called for naval operations to 
concentrate on the potential for future conflicts in littoral regions around the world. 
D. EVIDENCE WHICH SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS IN 
" ... FROM THE SEA" 
Recent developments within littoral regions throughout the world and studies of 
actual naval force employment and missions suggest that the findings and 
recommendations in " .. From the Sea" were accurate. 
1. Potential For Conflict Exists in Littoral Regions 
The oceans throughout the world, particularly near-shore areas, have been used 
more intensively with the growth of the world population and advances in technology. 
Problems of overuse and unsustainable exploitation have become more common and are a 
source for potential future conflict. So too are the activities which threaten the 
maintenance of order at sea. 
a. Fishing Rights 
Expanding populations have grown more dependent on fish. In 30 years, 
from 1970 to 1990, the total world catch rose nearly 50 percent to 100 million metric tons 
[Ref. 18]. Failure to manage this resource has led to depletions of these catches. Coastal 
nations are ever more conscious of foreign nations who fish in their territorial waters. 
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This has led to several international disputes, the most recent being between Canada and 
Spain. 
b. Energy Exploitation and Territorial Expansion 
Exploitation of offshore oil and gas from the continental margin (that part 
of the continent that extends underwater to the deep seabed) has progressed with the help 
of advancements in technology. As much as 30 percent of the worlds energy resources 
come from offshore areas and this figure will most probably increase as the demand for 
energy continues to rise throughout the world [Ref. 18]. However, so to will the potential 
for conflict, as coastal nations claim rights over the same offshore deposits. 
Heated disputes over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea among 
China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei provide just one example of 
this phenomenon. These seemingly insignificant islands consist of several islets, not 
more than 90 acres in area, and about 50 coral reefs and sea mounts. However, their 
waters may be rich in oil, gas, and other sea-based minerals, which are obviously 
important resources to sustain economic growth. Conflict over control of these islands 
has occurred in the early 1970s and most recently in early 1995. [Ref. 19] 
c. Waste Disposal 
Of the world's 5.6 billion inhabitants, 3.5 billion live in coastal regions 
[Ref. 18]. Disposal of garbage and sewage into the oceans from these coastal regions has 
led to increased levels of pollution. Friction is possible when nations, which depend on 
the ocean, find their ocean resources contaminated by the waste of other nations. 
18 
d. Maritime Disorder 
The act of piracy, particularly in the Malacca and Singapore Straits and the 
East China Sea, has increased as the economies in the Western Paciti'c have grown in size 
and importance. According to the International Maritime Bureau, there were 1 03 such 
incidents of piracy in 1993 alone [Ref. 19]. The scale and economic consequence of 
numbers such as this is minimal, considering the overall amount of trade through these 
areas. Nonetheless, piracy still threatens the free and unimpeded navigation of shipping, 
which is vital to U.S. economic security. 
Other near-land issues that threaten the maintenance of order at sea and 
subsequently U.S. national and political security are illegal arms running and forced 
migrations - resulting from regional conflicts, civil wars, and poor economic conditions -
as well as drug smuggling. Along with the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Navy has had to 
confront these issues most recently in the Adriatic and Caribbean Seas. 
2. Actual Employment of Naval Forces Has Historically Taken Place 
Near-land 
Frank Uhlig, folmer editor of the Naval War College Review, conducted an 
exhaustive study of the actual employment of naval forces in his recent book, How 
Navies Fight: The U.S. Navy and Its Allies. Through extensive historical analysis, he 
concluded that the most common employment of these forces was the support of 
operations ashore, the landing of forces, and the protection of shipping at sea. His 
findings most clearly substantiate the conclusions of the NFCPE. [Ref. 20] 
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E. CONCLUSION 
How and why the U.S. Navy shifted its maritime strategy must be understood in 
order to promote a shared understanding among those who will support and implement 
this strategy. Critical thinking among the NFCPE was required to assess the threats of 
the future security environment in order to extrapolate requirements for naval capabilities. 
" ... From the Sea" implies that naval forces should expect conflict within littoral regions 
and must be capable of operating with proficiency in them. Recent trends and findings 
support this judgment. However, conditions near-land are substantially different from 
those encountered in the open-ocean. Therefore, this thesis will now set out to define the 
littoral and describe the difficulties of conducting operations in this type of environment. · 
20 
III. THE LITTORAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE ENEMY 
A. LITTORAL ENVIRONMENT 
1. Definition 
Naval Doctrine Publication I, "Naval Warfare," defines "littoral" as "those 
regions relating to or existing on a shore or coastal region, within direct control of and 
vulnerable to the power ofNaval expeditionary forces." [Ref. 21] The U.S. Navy further 
describes Littoral Warfare as " ... the ability to mass overwhelming joint and allied force 
and deliver it ashore to influence, deter, contain and overcome the enemy." [Ref. 22] 
Although it is possible to influence events on land by projecting power over 
littoral waters and thus avoid the need to operate in them, eventually logistic support from 
the sea will be required to sustain land forces and if required, amphibious forces must 
transit through them to conduct a landing. Even in operations with limited objectives or 
operations other than war, such as low intensity conflicts, Noncombatant Evacuation 
Operations (NEO), peacekeeping, and showing the flag operations, the naval role is to 
exert influence near land with a constant and visible presence. At some point, naval 
forces must operate within the littoral. 
2. Difficulties of Conducting Operations 
To operate effectively in the littoral, naval forces must be able to handle the 
inherent difficulties of this environment. Captain Wayne P. Hughes, USN (Retired), 
author of Fleet Tactics, has characterized warfare in the littoral as " ... warfare in confmed 
and congested waters. In this arena, the enemy will not only contest our control, but will 
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also use to his advantage the limited battlespace and congestion found in this 
environment." [Ref. 1] 
a. Geographical Constraints 
Compared to the vastness of open ocean operations, the littoral areas are 
confined by geographical constraints which significantly reduce the size of the 
battlespace and increase the vulnerability of units operating within them. The very nature 
of the waters in this type of environment - often narrow, shallow, and bound by the 
shoreline creates unique challenges which lead to interesting insights. 
CDR John Stavridis, USN, former commanding officer ofUSS Barry 
(DDG 52), recently noted in a forum on naval tactics for small wars that, operations in the 
littoral significantly reduce a ship's ability to maneuver- an extremely uncomfortable 
operating environment for a Commanding Officer. By his account, CDR Stavridis and 
the Barry participated in operations within the last two years in Haiti, the Adriatic and the 
Arabian Gulf. The ship routinely operated in waters as shallow as 50 feet with a 
navigational draft of 36 feet. The risk of grounding was therefore a serious concern. 
Highly competent and vigilant watch teams, both on the bridge and CIC, were 
necessitated at all times, which was a significant energy drain upon personnel. [Ref. 23] 
b. Increased Threats and Reduced Reaction Time 
In addition to the considerably reduced maneuverability and constant 
threat of grounding, units operating close to shore are within the surveillance and 
weapons envelope of the enemy. The modem coastal defense system, comprised of 
radar, electric support measures, coastal artillery, anti-surface missiles, high speed patrol 
craft, land-based aircraft, mines, and in some cases submarines, poses a continuous and 
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immediate threat. The enemy has the ability to initiate strikes at any time with little or no 
warning, a circumstance which poses extremely difficult problems for units operating 
within this type of environment. By far the most numerous and varied threat to naval 
warships in the littoral environment is the anti-surface missile. 
As discussed previously, the proliferation of missile technology to coastal 
nations has enabled them to carry advanced missiles. Missiles can be launched from 
land, small fast patrol craft, submarines, and aircraft. The characteristics of most of these 
missiles include: high speeds; deceptive terminal maneuvers to penetrate hard-kill 
defenses; and, a variety of guidance systems to defeat soft-kill defenses. Warships 
operating within the confines of the littoral environment are faced with reduced reaction 
time to respond to missile threats, and the threat sectors from which the missiles can be 
launched are often large and ambiguous. 
CDR Stavridis notes that the game of racquetball is a representative 
paradigm of operations within the littoral environment. In the game, the ball moves with 
blinding speed and careens off the sidewalls in many directions, forcing the opponent to 
make quick decisions and leaving little time to react [Ref. 23]. The lethality of the threat, 
the short distances, and the wide area from which enemy weapons along the coast can be 
launched, force platforms to detect the threat and conduct defensive measures within 
seconds. 
c. Sensor Degradation and Uncertainty 
Detection and rapid engagement of suspected threats, however, are by no 
means easy tasks. First, sensors and guidance systems are affected by heavy land clutter 
which results in severely degraded detection and tracking capabilities. Often false targets 
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are created and, even worse, actual targets are masked [Ref. 24]. Secondly, and perhaps 
more importantly, the intrinsic density, clutter, and congestion within the littoral 
environment - tankers, freighters, fishing boats, and aircraft - result in uncertainties in 
identification and decon:fliction. Time is therefore required to develop an accurate 
tactical picture before one can engage the enemy or the incoming threat. Unfortunately, 
as previously mentioned, time is a scarce commodity when it comes to self-defense in 
this arena. 
Rear Admiral Yedidia Ya'ari, Israeli Navy, among other things, discusses 
an anti-surface missile scenario in his essay, "The Littoral Arena: A Word of Caution." 
The scenario serves well to put in perspective the time constraints and ambiguities of a 
surface missile attack in coastal waters. He uses the Russian SS-N-22, a Mach 2-plus 
sea-skimmer missile, against a surface target 15 miles offshore. It is assumed that the 
ship is constantly tracked by coastal radar, and that, therefore, the ship is unaware of 
when it has been targeted. The missile is launched and will impact the ship within 40 
seconds. In order to react effectively, the ship" ... must be ready not only to detect it [the 
missile] the instant it is launched but to have every countermeasure operating within the 
first thirty seconds. Setting aside the first five or ten seconds for resolving ambiguity in 
identification, the reaction time is reduced to some twenty seconds." [Ref. 25] 
d. Rigid Rules of Engagement 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) thus tend to dominate the minds of the 
Commanding Officer and Tactical Actio-n Officers because of the need to respond quickly 
to threats. Incidents involving the USS STARK and the USS VINCENNES tend to 
confuse the issue, however. Failure to resolve uncertainty and a hesitation to react on the 
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part of a ship may lead to a missile hit. On the other hand, quick and rapid reaction to 
what appears to be a threat may lead to undesirable consequences. In order to avoid such 
incidents and possibly limit the escalation of conflicts, there has been an increased 
emphasis on restrictive control over Commanding Officers with regard to ROE. Often, 
the Commanding Officer is given rigid constraints on how and when to use weapons, 
which serves to seriously limit the ability of the ship to defend itself until it may be 
ultimately too late. [Ref. 24] 
e. Human Factors and Equipment Concerns 
Another challenge in conducting operations in the littoral concerns human 
factors. People play a crucial role in operating the systems required to counter the 
inherent threat. It is by no means realistic to assume that shipboard personnel can 
continuously perform at a state of alertness for extended periods of time, especially with 
the knowledge that a mistake or malfunction of equipment could well result in the 
disablement or loss of the platform. Additionally, it is not possible to take down systems 
to conduct preventive maintenance on vital equipment, because this could degrade 
weapon and sensor performance. Obviously, the stress on shipboard personnel and the 




In his essay, "The Seapower of the Coastal State," Jacob Borrensen defines a 
coastal state as a state which is located along the sea, but without the ability to establish 
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sea control outside its local waters. This state can, however, control its local waters quite 
effectively. [Ref 26] 
2. Assumption 
A distinction must be made with regards to coastal states. Some may be poor, 
badly governed, and ill-equipped for naval operations while others are quite capable. In 
the Middle East and Eastern Asia- regions which are vital to U.S. national interests and 
possess the potential for future conflicts - several coastal states are capable of conducting 
highly professional naval operations. For the purposes of this paper, coastal states with 
competent coastal navies are our subject. 
3. Characteristics 
Some general characteristics are shared by most such navies. First, coastal navies 
are prepared and trained exclusively for operations within the littoral environment. They 
understand and are fully acquainted with the geography and conditions of their local 
waters, which serve well to offer cover and protection to their forces. Second, since these 
coastal navies intend to operate in and control these waters, their weapon and sensor 
systems are optimized to operate without degradation in a near-land environment. Third, 
the ships and patrol craft of a coastal navy are relatively small and expendable. The 
proliferation of advanced missile technology allows the concentration of significant 
amounts of firepower on small platforms. These ships are designed for local operations 
and not long-distance operations. Lastly, these navies optimize their doctrine, tactics and 
coordination to gain comparative advantages over forces not acquainted with these waters 
or the surrounding environment. This is particularly true when the coastal state can pick 
the time and place for engagement. 
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4. Coastal Navy Roles and Missions 
The primary functions of the navies of these coastal states can be broken down 
into three elements: protection against the illegal exploitation of natural resources within 
exclusive economic zones; the exercise of sovereignty and control over territorial waters; 
and, deterrence against invasion from the sea. [Ref. 26] 
In order to support these functions, the coastal state will most likely utilize a 
balanced approach with regard to its naval forces. Based upon this concept, a mixture of 
elements of the coastal defense system - surface, subsurface, air and mine threats - is used 
to provide both a synchronized defense and a formidable offensive capability. 
Synchronized defense is the ability to operate fast patrol boats and submarines 
within weapons range of each other, as well as inside the range of coastal artillery, land-
based anti-ship missiles, mines, and attack aircraft. This complex operating environment 
forces the opponent to operate in one of two ways. One option is to perform all tasks 
simultaneously - ASUW, AA W, ASW, mine-clearance, etc. The other is to employ 
enough platforms that he can lose some and still fulfill all mission requirements one at a 
time. [Ref. 26] 
Most states realize, however, that in an open conflict or all-out war against a 
strong opponent with the will to carry on, they can not guarantee victory. They perhaps 
could win some battles and cause damage to the opposing force, but they would not be 
able to sustain themselves in the long run. Coastal states will therefore most likely 
conduct operations which aim to" ... bleed the enemy's military and political resources, 
until he comes to the conclusion that the price of continuing the war exceeds any gain he 
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might hope to reap from it." [Ref. 26] In other words it might be in the coastal state's 
interests to prolong the conflict to mount political pressure against such a conflict on the 
enemy's home front. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The littoral environment and the potential enemy which may be encountered in 
these surroundings pose new challenges for U.S. naval forces. Geographical constraints, 
limited battlespace, reduced reaction time to incoming threats, the lethality of enemy 
weapons, ambiguous threat bearings, clutter, congestion, uncertainty, restrictive ROEs, 
unrealistic and unattainable states of readiness, and the eventual degradation of weapon 
and sensor performance equate to increased vulnerabilities for naval forces which operate 
within littoral areas. 
The potential enemy of the future - the coastal state - will be proficient at 
operations in his coastal waters. His training, weapons, sensors, tactics, and doctrine will 
be optimized to gain comparative advantages over opposing naval forces, especially when 
they can dictate when and where battles will take place. U.S. naval forces which are not 
prepared, trained, or organized for operations against an enemy of this stature in his home 
waters will suffer punishment. 
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IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF TACTICS, DOCTRINE, AND 
TRAINING FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The objective of this chapter is to relate the importance of tactics, doctrine, and 
training for command and control. Additionally, the nature of their relationship will be 
discussed to show how these factors actually create the potential to achieve prompt and 
harmonious action among forces in battle. The purpose of which is to lay the framework 
from which U.S. tactical and doctrinal development as well as training requirements for 
naval operations in littoral waters will be evaluated. 
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Joint Publication 1-02, the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, defines command and control as, 
The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated 
commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. 
Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of 
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures which 
are employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating and 
controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment ofthe mission. 
[Ref. 27] 
Given the definitions length and complexity, command and control is somewhat 
difficult to comprehend and subject to varied interpretations. The Command and Control 
Research Program of the National Defense University, an active program which directs 
research on emerging national issues in command and control, breaks down the definition 
in its publication, Command and Control: The Literature and Commentaries. The 
29 
purpose of which is to provide a better understanding of the breadth and scope of the 
subject. 
1. Command and Control as a Function, Process, and System 
According to the research program, command and control is thought of as a 
function, a process, and a supporting system. The function refers to the exercise of 
~-
authority and direction of a commander over assigned forces, the process includes the 
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling of forces and operations, and the system 
includes the personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed 
by a commander. [Ref. 28] 
Suffice it to say the function, process, and system which constitute command and 
control provide the foundation upon which naval operations are planned and executed. 
This can best be explained and depicted through the use of a command and control cycle 
paradigm devised by Dr. J.S. Lawson and Professor Paul Moose of the United States 
Naval Postgraduate School. 
2. Lawson-Moose Command and Control Cycle 
The Lawson-Moose Command and Control Cycle is a system which senses the 
environment containing both the enemy and friendly forces, processes the observed 
information, and compares the information with an established desired state. The 
commander then decides, based upon his examination of the situation, what actions to 





Figure 1. Lawson Command and Control Cycle [From Ref. 29] 
As an abstraction, the Lawson-Moose Command and Control Cycle serves well to 
show how command and control - the function, process, and system - enables a 
commander to make decisions and exercise authority over subordinate commanders in 
accomplishing assigned military objectives. 
3. Effect of Technological Improvements in Command and Control 
·Support Systems 
Today, an era where improved communication and information system 
technologies have greatly enhanced the ability to rapidly process and distribute 
information, forces have the ability to seize opportunities and meet objectives across a 
wide range of military operations. Unfortunately, however, many associate command 
and control with technological improvements in these support systems rather than 
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recognizing that they are created to help fulfill the function of command and the 
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling of forces and operations. 
As an example, a recent command and control internet newsgroup forum, 
established by the students of the Command and Control Curriculum at the United States 
Naval Postgraduate School, was initiated to uncover and discuss current command and 
control issues. Almost all of the discussions revolve around command and control 
support system issues such as system architectures, network config~ation and 
management tools, transmission media types, and bandwidth limitations. Granted, 
nothing diminishes the importance of these areas in providing continuous near real time 
information in support of military operations. However, these support systems constitute 
only part of the established command and control definition. 
4. Building Effective Command and Control Through Tactics, Doctrine 
and Training 
Naval Doctrine Publication 6, ''Naval Command and Control" (NDP 6), describes 
the importance of rapid and aggressive high-tempo naval operations selected to deliver 
decisive blows against an enemy. Rapid tempo of operations is generated through 
effective command and control. Effective command and control is achieved not only 
through the use of support systems, which provide an accurate view of the battlespace to 
senior and subordinate commanders alike, but perhaps more importantly through a shared 
vision among all commanders of the desired state and the purpose for attaining it and the 
tactics and doctrine that will be used. These factors enable the friendly force Command 
and Control Cycle to operate faster than that of the enemy, which ultimately results in 
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rapid and overwhelming attacks against a force that is unable to react effectively. [Ref. 
27] 
NDP 6 refers to the shared vision among senior and subordinate commanders as 
"unity of effort." Thomas P. Coakley, author of Command and Control for War and 
Peace, states that well formulated tactics, commonly understood doctrine, and effective 
training ideally unites the minds of commanders up and down the chain of command and 
instills teamwork and trust among the ·men and women of the force [Ref. 30]. 
a. Inter-Relationship Among Tactics, Doctrine, and Training 
Tactics are the methods by which forces are employed. In other words 
they are the action and coordination among ships, aircraft, submarines, and land forces in 
battle. Tactics are dictated by the mission at hand, the capabilities, strengths, and 
weaknesses of both the enemy and friendly forces, the environment, weather, and time 
available. They are developed through skills and knowledge acquired through realistic 
and extensive training. 
Training is the primary means for improving a force's readiness to fight .. 
It serves two purposes: first, training serves to build proficiency and confidence among 
naval forces in preparation for battle; and secondly, training exercises provide the means 
to execute plans, tactics, and doctrines so that they may either be validated, refined, or 
negated. 
Doctrine consists of fundamental principles by which naval forces guide 
their actions. Doctrine is intended to be a general guide to the application of what is 
mutually accepted or believed to be true. It is essentially derived through the tactical and 
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training process at each echelon of command from policy and strategy to individual unit 
techniques and procedures. 
Tactics, doctrine, and training are inter-related, meaning, their 
development and implementation are highly dependent upon each other. Taken together, 
they improve the effectiveness of forces in combat by enabling timely and united action 
among forces in battle. 
b. Historical Perspective 
Perhaps the best example of this relationship is found with Admiral 
Horatio Nelson of the Royal Navy. Nelson firmly believed that no plan could survive 
engagement with the enemy nor could he directly control his forces amongst the chaos of 
battle. As such, he was of the opinion that the way to achieve victory was through the 
direct indoctrination of his subordinates. 
Indoctrination was conducted through extensive training where tactics 
were learned and rehearsed. Over time, the tactics which were developed and mastered 
were imbued in the minds of his subordinates as doctrine. In battle, Nelson gave little to 
no direction and allowed his subordinates to conduct themselves with almost absolute 
initiative. Nelson did so with the beliefthat they were of the same spirit and mind as 
himself [Ref. 27]. In a sense, Nelson knew what the subordinates were going to do and 
the subordinates knew what Nelson wanted to achieve. This resulted in cohesion, 
reliability, mutual understanding, support, and ultimately victory. 
In retrospect, the Battle of the Nile did not go as planned. However, as 
Captain Wayne Hughes so eloquently states," ... in a deeper sense it (the battle) is the 
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epitome of a sound plan executed flawlessly in spirit." [Ref. 29] This could not have 
been accomplished without sound tactics, doctrine, and training. 
President Theodore Roosevelt, himself a former Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy, understood the importance of an established foundation in naval tactical and 
doctrinal thought in times of peace. He attributed success in future naval warfare not 
only in this foundation, but also in sound and efficient training. In his eyes, training 
served to reinforce tactics and doctrine as well as prepare naval forces to fight effectively 
in battle. Although spoken nearly a century ago, his words are still to this day relevant: 
It cannot be too often repeated that in modem war, and especially 
in modem naval war, the chief factor in achieving triumph is what 
has been done in the way of thorough preparation and training 
before the beginning of war. [Ref. 21] 
The function of command and the planning, directing, coordinating, and 
controlling of forces and operations - often ignored aspects of command and control - are 
thus enabled through tactics, doctrine, and training. 
C. CONCLUSION 
In essence, tactics and doctrine are key, and often overlooked, elements of 
command and control. They promote a "shared knowledge" among those throughout the 
force. This shared knowledge is further enhanced by training where experience is gained 
through exercises designed to develop skills and instincts required of forces in combat. 
Tactics, doctrine, and training ultimately serve to enhance cohesion, mutual 
understanding, and support, thereby creating the potential to achieve prompt and 
harmonious action among forces in battle- the ultimate objective of command and 
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control. On the day of battle, a naval force will fight as well or as poorly as they are 
prepared and trained. 
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V. EVALUATION OF U.S. NAVY LITTORAL WARFARE 
TACTICS, DOCTRINE, AND TRAINING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Navy is without question the strongest in the world. No other nation, at 
least in the foreseeable future, can challenge its ability to maintain sea control or threaten 
its maritime superiority. However, as the Navy shifts its strategy to include the additional 
requirement to control the littoral arena and support land operations from the sea, it must 
be cognizant of the fact that their warships, aircraft, and submarines are designed and its 
people are trained for operations on the high seas rather than operations near land. 
The primary threats to the force within the littoral region, as in the open ocean, are 
missiles and torpedoes. What changes in the littorals is the fact that the battlefield is no 
longer open ocean, where survival depends on adequate warning, time for maneuver, 
depth of frre, and the absence of neutral aircraft and shipping. The inshore battlefield is a 
complex environment where warning and reaction time are reduced, maneuver is 
complicated by shallow water and the always present mine threat, and classification and 
deconfliction are dominant issues amidst abundant aircraft and shipping. Given the 
intricacies of the littoral environment, it would be imprudent to suppose that these 
seagoing forces can turn their open ocean proficiency to advantage in this setting. This 
chapter attempts to evaluate how well the United States is prepared to conduct such 
operations by reviewing its tactics, doctrine and training requirements. 
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B. TACTICS 
As stated in Chapter IV, tactics are the methods by which forces are employed in 
battle. In order to evaluate how well the U.S. Navy is prepared tactically to conduct 
littoral operations, the following areas will be assessed: people, technology, tactical 
dissemination, and current tactics. 
1. People 
There is a perception throughout much of the Navy and the American public that 
extensive damage and losses to U.S. naval forces are not possible, nor are they tolerable. 
There is no basis for this. In fact, history shows that warfare within the constraints of the 
littoral arena is fast, furious, and deadly. Conflicts such as the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, 
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the 1980-1987 Iran-Iraq War, and the Falklands War of 1982, 
suggest otherwise. Shipboard personnel would be forced to continuously perform at a 
state of high alertness for extended periods of time and would have to expect hits during 
combat operations to control this environment. As a result, the morale, physical and 
mental conditioning, and endurance of the men and women - perhaps some of the most 
crucial elements of battle- would undoubtedly decline over time and be severely tested 
once damage and losses were sustained. 
A decline or collapse of these elements does not guarantee defeat. The British 
were successful in their efforts to gain control of the Falkland Islands despite incurring 
heavy damage and losses. In the memoirs of Admiral Sandy Woodward, the Falklands 
Battle Group Commander, he describes in detail the extreme difficulties of leading his 
people through the calamity of war and how they narrowly escaped defeat against the 
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Argentineans [Ref. 31]. Damage or losses to U.S. naval forces may not result in defeat, 
but will certainly adversely affect the overall effectiveness of the force and perhaps 
negatively sway public opinion. 
2. Technology 
In Fleet Tactics, Captain Hughes stresses the fact that effective tactical 
development adapts to technology. He warns that all too often the American Navy aims 
to solve its tactical deficiencies with technological improvements. This is not to say that 
they are neither important, nor required for the Navy to advance capably into the future. 
On the contrary, he points out technological improvements will correct operational 
deficiencies, but they take time for development and implementation. It is vital to 
remember that there is a need to be prepared to fight with what you have today, not 
tomorrow. Captain Hughes states, "(t)he tactician stays ready by knowing his weapon 
systems." [Ref. 29] Knowledge of current platforms is equally important. A look at 
these reveals some interesting insights. 
a. Weapons and Sensors 
Current naval sensors and guidance systems are optimized for operations 
in the open ocean. Land and the otherwise cluttered environment of the littoral were not 
considered in the development of most of these sensors. Therefore, their use in this 
environment severely degrades their performance. As an example, during Desert Storm 
Aegis cruisers were saturated with a super-abundance of tracks caused by the extreme 
sensitivity of their SPY-lB radars to land, frequent sandstorms, and chaff expended by 
coalition air forces at the slightest hint of enemy air activity [Ref. 22]. Additionally, 
missile systems which utilize active homing, such as the Harpoon missile, are not as 
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effective in the littoral environment. Their seeker search window is large enough to pick 
up land when searching for targets close to shore. The missile will most likely head for 
the land and miss its intended target or will home on innocent vessels, oil rigs etc. 
b. Platforms 
The Department ofthe Navy reported, in their summary report of the 
lessons learned of the Falklands War, that modem warships can be defended against 
modem weapons as long as they have defense in depth and are able to sustain hits, absorb 
damage, and. keep fighting [Ref. 32]. The confined and collapsed battlespace of the 
littoral region eliminates the ability to establish such a defense in depth. Damage 
sustained by American units, such as the USS Stark and USS Samuel B. Roberts, 
demonstrate the inability of 4000 ton warships to absorb damage and continue to fight. If 
confirmation of ship vulnerability is needed, study of the Falklands War provides several 
examples where hits incurred by warships either sank or placed them out of action. 
If damage is to be expected in future conflicts, the costs of current surface 
platforms should also be contemplated. Consider the costs imposed against U.S. 
warships that were damaged in recent conflicts at the hand of relatively cheap weapons: 
• Exocet hit against USS Stark.: $42 million damage. 
• Mine damage to USS Samuel B. Roberts: $96 million damage. 
• Mine damage to USS Tripoli: $4 million damage. 
• Mine damage to USS Princeton: $17 million damage. [Ref. 33] 
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Newly commissioned Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke destroyers amount to 
roughly $1 billion each. A loss of one would be significant, not only in terms of dollars, 
but especially in lost firepower potential. Hits taken in the littoral environment will be 
costly. 
3. Tactical Dissemination 
Naval tactics are documented in Naval Warfare Publications (NWPs) and Fleet 
Marine Publications (FMPs). Together they consist of over 800 volumes- not an easy 
task for one to read, teach, or study. They still are mostly directed to meet the Soviet 
naval threat! When specific new threats are encountered or new weapon systems are 
developed, the Surface Warfare Engineering Development Group issues new tactics to 
the fleet through Tactical Memorandums (Tacmemos). Tacmemos must then be 
maintained for an average of three years before they are incorporated into a NWP. The 
result is that Tacmemos (though tentative) are studied while NWPs (though authoritative) 
are not. It would be an interesting - if colossal - task to determine which NWP tactics are 
known and practiced in training. 
In light of the innumerable changes to the international security environment and 
subsequent enemy order of battle in recent years, even Tacmemos have not been an 
efficient means of distributing tactical modifications to the fleet. The warfare 
publications are antiquated and in serious need of revision. To overcome the voluminous 
burden and outdated information within these warfare publications, the Navy has moved 
to long, detailed Operational Tasking Orders (Optasks) that include their own tactics. 
[Ref. 34] 
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World Wide Optasks, organized by warfare area and maintained by Fleet 
Commanders, provide a standardized means by which to distribute tactics. A Battle 
Group Commander then distributes an Optask Supplement for each respective warfare 
area to modify or add measures driven to meet specific threats based upon current threat 
and area assessments in a particular region. This process is the only means to ensure that 
the tactics remain current and geographically specific. 
Captain Neil Byrne, Commanding Officer of the Pacific Tactical Training Group, 
wholeheartedly states that written tactics must not only be current, but also" ... clear, 
concise, and memorable." [Ref. 34] Unfortunately, current tactics do not meet these 
criteria. Specifically, Optasks have not alleviated the onus of dealing with an over-
abundance of information. For example, the World Wide Optask for Anti-Surface 
Warfare is thirty pages in length. The Optask Supplement for Anti-Surface Warfare for a 
recent deployable battle group consisted of twenty-five pages. Although far less 
extensive than the Naval Warfare Publications, fifty-five pages for only one of many 
warfare areas is not satisfactory. Thus, Optasks even fail to achieve what they purport to 
achieve - pragmatic doctrine for forces in battle. 
4. Current Tactics 
The U.S. Navy professes the capability to conduct operations to control the littoral 
area and to support operations on land, yet tactics for such operations are clearly lagging. 
An event during Desert Storm illustrates: On 25 February 1991, two Iraqi Silkworm 
missiles were launched from land positions and directed toward the USS Missouri which 
was conducting naval gunfire support 18 miles off the Kuwaiti coast. Of the two 
missiles, one misfired and the other was destroyed by the HMS Gloucester. The 
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confrontation was the first and only surface-to-air engagement by a cruise missile. 
Although no damage resulted to friendly units, examination reveals that the Missouri and 
her escorts were in disarray and probably would not have prevented two hits had the anti-
ship cruise missiles been reliable and well aimed. The Gloucester and other escorts were 
to seaward of the Missouri; they were nearly dead in the water which precluded them 
from turning and unmasking their batteries or reducing their cross section relative to the 
incoming threat, and they interfered with each other when they accelerated to do so; they 
were confined to a channel cleared by minesweepers which was so narrow that it 
curtailed their maneuvers; and, chaff and other decoys were expended is such large 
quantities that their supply would have quickly been drained if there were more attacks. 
Tactics for such operations were non-existent, and remain so to this day. [Ref. 35] 
C. TACTICAL DOCTRINE 
The goal of tactical doctrine or fighting instructions is to improve the 
effectiveness of forces by prescribing a framework for prompt and unified action in 
battle. Given the complexities, limited battlespace, and reduced reaction time within the 
littoral environment, harmonious and coordinated effort under the constant pressure and 
stress of hostilities must be nearly automatic and is impossible without_ sound doctrine, 
which anticipates the tactical situation that may develop. 
Within the U.S. Navy system, doctrine is different at each echelon of command-
the policy/strategy level, campaign level, fleet level, and individual unit level. 
Policy/strategy doctrine unifies beliefs and thought among all the forces. This is a 
NCA/JCS function. The White Paper " ... From the Sea" is an example of this type of 
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doctrine. Campaign level doctrine transforms strategic thought into activity to support 
theater objectives such as the rapid movement of forces and their sustainment to provide 
crisis response when required. This is a CINC function. Fleet level doctrine guides 
action among units within a battle group. It is much like a football playbook, with 
formations, search plans and distributions of fire which are implemented to transform 
combat potential into combat power. Lastly, individual unit level doctrine consists of 
single unit techniques and procedures which are aimed to foster automatic and 
instantaneous action, such as defeating an incoming missile. [Ref. 35] 
1. Campaign and Policy/Strategy Doctrine 
Doctrine at the campaign and policy/strategy levels is geared predominately to 
ensure unity of belief among those within the force. Doctrine at both these levels is well 
established. The U.S. Navy translated the current National Security Strategy and 
National Military Strategy into a well formulated policy/strategy doctrine through the 
White Papers, " ... From the Sea" and "Forward ... From the Sea." These documents have 
provided the impetus for further doctrinal development at lower echelons, and instituted a 
framework from which to base the Navy's future force structure, acquisition programs, 
and allocation of resources. 
2. Individual Unit and Fleet Doctrine 
LCDR Dudley W. Knox, a proponent for sound doctrine within the Navy at the 
beginning of this century, stressed the importance of individual unit and fleet level 
doctrine in a 1915 Proceedings article. He stated that doctrine at these levels were 
"(g)overning ideas to which every situation may be referred and from which there may be 
derived a sound course of action." [Ref. 36] Littoral Warfare doctrine at the individual 
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unit and fleet levels, where it is needed most, is non-existent within the U.S. Surface 
Navy. 
Doctrine is a compilation of tactics. Without the tactics for fighting near land, 
there is no doctrine. ATP-1, the governing document for formations, search plans, and 
other evolutions since the 1950s, is outdated and obsolete to support littoral operations. 
Formations and signals are not prescribed to: provide guidance when mines and 
minesweepers are present; protect a main body or high value unit and offer mutual 
support; incorporate tactical command and control procedures for the earliest possible 
warning and fastest possible response to enemy missile attacks; and, give speed and 
courses to steer relative to threat axes so that weapons and sensors are optimized to detect 
and destroy incoming threats. The Silkworm missile attack addressed in the previous 
section also illustrates that there was no doctrine to provide the tactical commander with 
guidance to unite action among liis forces. 
3. Naval Doctrine Command 
The Navy established the Naval Doctrine Command in March 1993 primarily to. 
translate the vision and strategy established in " ... From the Sea" and "Forward ... From 
the Sea" into lower echelon doctrinal reality. Additionally, they espouse the integration 
of naval doctrine into the naval training and education system. The Command initially 
began with development ofNaval Doctrine Publications which have served well to 
enhance beliefs throughout the Navy at the campaign level. At present, the Doctrine 
Command has not undertaken the arduous task of developing fleet and individual unit 
level doctrine to support Littoral Warfare. 
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D. TRAINING 
Once again, training is the primary means for improving a force's readiness to 
fight. Training ensures that deploying forces are balanced, sustainable, flexible, and, 
responsive to requirements established by higher authority. Training for deployment 
begins with individual ships and squadrons where each gains unit qualifications and 
proficiency in basic mission areas. Force training then culminates with a joint fleet 
exercise in which deploying Task Force units demonstrate their readiness to perform 
required missions. In order to evaluate how well the U.S. Navy is trained to conduct 
operations in a littoral environment, individual unit and fleet training will be appraised. 
1. Individual Unit Training 
Training for individual units is classified as Basic Phase Training. It is conducted 
in stages, ashore and at sea, and is designed to work progressively toward the 
achievement of full combat readiness. The Atlantic/Pacific Surface Force Training 
Manual has established a standardized Tactical Training Strategy designed to achieve 
maximum combat readiness and interoperability between the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. 
The strategy provides a sound foundation in areas such as engineering, damage control, 
medical, seamanship, navigation, and administration. However, an examination of the 
combat systems training strategy indicates that most combat training is still oriented 
towards the open ocean "Soviet" threat. Training exercises are geared to gain efficiency 
in target acquisition, designation, and weapons firing, scouting, maneuvering, and 
command and control procedures based on sea room, early warning, and defense in depth. 
With few exceptions, this training at sea generally consists of exercises in operating areas 
46 
far from land where conditions are very much less stressful than in the littoral itself. As a 
result, ships are not adept in operating within the confines of the littoral in conditions that 
are fast, confusing, and extremely stressful. 
2. Fleet Training 
Fleet Training is conducted through what is classified as Intermediate and 
--· 
Advanced Training Phases. The overall objective of these phases is for units to 
participate cooperatively with each other in coordinated underway battle group 
operations, and to complete necessary inport and underway training evolutions, 
inspections, and equipment calibrations not completed during Basic Phase Training. 
In recent years Second and Third Fleets - responsible for implementing fleet 
training in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans respectively - have recognized the importance 
for battle groups to be flexible forces that not only can operate in the open ocean, during 
day and night, in all weather conditions, but in shallow and narrow waters as well. Within 
the littoral environment, their emphasis has been placed on conducting power projection, 
anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-surface, and electronic warfare operations. The Intermediate 
and Advanced Training Phases culminate with two fleet level exercises - COMPTUEX 
and FLEETEX - which are conducted at sea just prior to actual deployment. Up until a 
year ago, the two fleet exercises were the first opportunity for units attached to a 
particular battle group to operate together as a team. The squadron realignment and 
reorganization effort of 1995 was established so that squadrons would train and operate 
with each other throughout the training cycle and deploy together. This effort serves well 
to enhance the mutual understanding and cohesion among the units of the battle group. 
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Despite the recent increased emphasis on preparing units to conduct operations in. 
a littoral environment and the efforts to produce harmonious and coordinated actions 
among the units of each respective battle group, fleet training falls far short of preparing 
units for actual hostilities. Almost all of the training evolutions and exercises are 
conducted well out to sea in operating areas with little air and sea traffic. Land areas, 
choke points, and navigational hazards are simulated on charts and JOTS terminals, and 
synthetic tracks are incorporated into the link. As a result, watchteams and equipment 
operators are not subject to the rigors, stress, or difficulties inherent to the clutter of the 
littoral environment to: detect and identify enemy sub-surface, surface, and air contacts 
among the congestion of background shipping and the complications induced by land; 
operate in waters that are mined or provide mutual support for mine countermeasure units 
engaged in minesweeping operations; determine hostile intent or hostile action in 
accordance with ROE; and defend against missile and torpedo attacks with limited 
battlespace and reduced reaction time. 
In discussions with senior officers with regard to the obvious lack of training for 
littoral operations, the author found that all agreed. The U.S. Navy is well trained to 
conduct open ocean missions - strategic deterrence, sea control, maritime supremacy, and 
strategic sealift. Although the U.S. Navy in recent years has placed a greater emphasis on 
training for littoral operations, its individual unit training requirements are still tailored 
towards blue water operations and its fleet training is less than ideal in preparing forces 
with the quick-response tactics for the confusing, fast, deadly, and extremely stressful 
conditions found near land. Officers queried shared the belief that the U.S. Navy is most 
operationally proficient in the open ocean and, therefore, will be able to adopt this 
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proficiency to the littoral environment. Given the complexities of coastal waters, this is 
an imprudent assumption. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Professing the capability to operate with proficiency in the littoral environment 
without having the tactics, doctrine, or proper training to do so may lead to undesirable 
consequences for the Navy. 
Using an analogy, it would be ludicrous to assume that the Notre Dame football 
team could defeat Navy if they were not prepared both physically and mentally for the 
game and had no play book. Notre Dame, the most dominant of the two teams in terms 
of size, strength, and speed, winners of several national championships, a team built upon 
the foundations of tradition and prestige, would lose their game to Navy for the first time 
since the early 1960s. 
As he proceeded south to the Falkland Islands, Admiral Woodward wrote in his 
diary, "(w)hat is it today that I will wish tomorrow I had done yesterday?" [Ref. 31] 
Rather than waiting for tomorrow, today is the time for the Navy to develop the tactics 
for operations near land. They must be evaluated, refined,_practiced and learned through 
effective training. In time, mutual acceptance of these procedures will formulate itself 
into lower echelon doctrine which will ultimately produce unified effort among naval 
forces to effectively conduct operations within the littoral environment. 
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Having suggested the need for the U.S. Navy to develop and implement tactics, 
doctrines, and effective training programs to gain proficiency in operations to control 
littoral areas and support land operations from the sea, the question arises, how does this 
process begin? This chapter attempts to answer the question. 
The chapter is dividend into two parts. Part one is a case study of the Israeli 
Navy. It serves to provide a framework or paradigm of how the United States Navy 
might go about developing and implementing the tactics, doctrine and training to support 
the maritime strategy expressed in" ... From the Sea" and."Forward ... From the Sea." 
Part two is the author's attempt to initiate the impetus for tactical, doctrinal, and training 
development for operations within the littoral environment. 
2. Historical Perspective 
The Israeli Navy provides a superb example of the development and 
implementation of tactics, doctrine and training aimed to counter the threats which it 
confronted in Eastern Mediterranean littoral waters before the Yom Kippur War of 1973. 
It would be difficult to fully understand the significance of the development of the Israeli 
naval concept without first looking back at the creation of the Israeli Navy and other 
regional naval development following World War II. 
The first naval vessel of the Israeli Navy was an ice breaker built in 1927 for the 
U.S. Coast Guard. She was bought in 1947, named the "Jewish State," and did service as 
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an immigrant ship which transported Jewish emigres to the future state of Israel. 
Renamed the INS Eilat, she was outfitted with a cannon and had a maximum speed of 
only seven knots. She took part in a successful naval engagement off the coast of Tel 
Aviv in the War oflndependence in 1948. 
In the early to mid 1950s the Soviet Union developed a missile boat concept 
which envisioned offensive, defensive, and special operations attacks with numerous 
patrol craft within 20 to 30 miles ofthe shore [Ref. 37]. In the late 1950s, they had 
produced Komar and Osa fast patrol boats armed with the Styx missiles (25-30mi range). 
The Soviet Union began delivering these fast patrol craft along with the Styx 
missile to the Egyptian Navy in the early 1960s. By 1966, the Egyptians were equipped 
with both the Komar (75 tons) and Osa (200 tons) class patrol craft. The Israelis 
understood that they were facing a complete and drastic change in the balance of naval 
power within the region. Their fleet, by then consisting mostly of ex-British World War 
II vintage Z class destroyers, were no match in warfare against faster patrol craft 
equipped with accurate long-range surface-to-surface missiles. 
The need for a more modem and capable naval force posed a formidable 
challenge to the Israeli Navy. They understood that their naval force, inferior to that of 
the Egyptians and possibly Syria as well, required immediate force and equipment 
changes. Equally important, they realized that such an undertaking would require 
revision of concepts of operations, doctrines, tactics, and training. 
By early 1967, the Israelis had implemented an intermediate fix. First, they 
developed the Gabriel surface-to-surface missile (12mi range) and installed it on their Z 
class destroyers. Meanwhile, they were at the end of the design phase and early into the 
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production phase of a new 250-ton fast patrol craft. These Saar boats were to be 
equipped with the Gabriel missile in addition to 40 and 76 mm guns. Still inferior in 
ASCM range to the Egyptians, the Israelis were nonetheless engaged in well advanced 
thought of how to employ these new craft even before they were delivered. [Ref. 38] 
In October of 1967, the Israelis suffered the first anti-ship missile attack in 
--
history, launched by the Egyptians off Port Said. The now-aged destroyer Eilat was hit 
by three Styx missiles fired from an Osa patrol craft resulting in the death of 47 and 91 
wounded. The ship was surprised and had no means to defeat the missiles nor engage the 
Egyptian patrol craft [Ref. 39]. This event stressed the urgency and need for a new 
operational concept. 
3. Israeli Operational Missile Boat Concept 
The Israeli operational concept was primarily based upon a technological 
limitation - the Gabriel missile was out-ranged ten to fifteen miles by the Styx missile. In 
other words, an Israeli patrol craft would have to approach the enemy more than ten miles 
inside Styx missile range before they could fire missiles. The Israeli Navy knew they 
could not depend on aircraft for either reconnaissance or attack. With this in mind, the 
concept called for fighting at night, and full use of surprise generated by early detection 
and identification in order to saturate the enemy with sheer numbers of patrol craft and 
missiles. 
A substantial scouting force would proceed ahead of the main body about half the 
distance of the effective range of the Gabriel missile for detection and identification of 
the enemy. Once detected, the enemy would be closed at high speed by the main forces 
and attacked when within the firing range of their missiles. During this phase, the patrol 
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craft would have to evade, out-maneuver, or destroy Styx missiles if encountered. Lastly, 
the patrol craft were to continue to close the enemy, firing their Gabriel missiles and 
finally destroying the enemy with guns. Obviously the most difficult aspect of this 
concept was closing while inside the enemy's weapons range. Therefore, the 
development and implementation of procedures to avoid or destroy enemy missiles 
became paramount. [Ref. 38] 
Scouting procedures, EM CON conditions, electronic warfare, hardkill and softkill 
anti-missile procedures, coordinated anti-ship missile attacks, as well as gunnery 
procedures, were developed and extensively tested both at sea and inport with the use of 
state-of-the-art tactical trainers in Haifa. The tests served as a mechanism for identifying 
weaknesses and shortfalls in their tactics, which were then evaluated, refined, adopted, 
and mastered. The exercises served to build proficiency and confidence in their ability to 
fight as a team. The entire naval force developed a common bond and mutual 
understanding of their procedures and how they were to be executed. Eventually this 
bond and mutual understanding coalesced into a simple, clear and powerful doctrine 
which each and every member of the naval force - from the most junior sailor to the 
highest ranking officer - could relate to, understand, and execute in battle. 
Israeli missile boats operated under the following three-stage doctrine: 
Stage 1: Detect and identify the enemy as early as possible. 
Stage 2: Close range and attack when at own effective missile firing range. 
During the execution of this second stage, out-maneuver and avoid being hit by 
enemy missiles when encountered. 
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Stage 3: Within own effective range, continue to close range, while firing own 
missiles. Use guns to finally destroy the enemy. 
[Ref. 38] 
The Israeli missile boat tactical development and doctrine has been described not only to 
show its clarity and simplicity, but also for its potency in meaning. Captain Byrne would 
admire the fact that the doctrine is clear, concise, and memorable. Captain Hughes would 
commend the Israelis for a tactical doctrine that, " ... allow(s) for subtle and complex 
considerations, for variations, and for both error and initiative at the moment of 
execution." [Ref. 29] 
4. Israeli Naval Engagements of the Yom Kippur War 
The measure of how well the aforementioned tactics, doctrine, and training · 
prepared the Israeli Navy was in the crucible of naval combat in the Yom Kippur War. 
The battle of Latakia will be discussed because it was the first battle in which the Israeli 
concepts were put to the test, the first missile boat on missile boat engagement in history, 
and for the most part, is indicative of the remaining battles of the conflict. 
The Battle of Latakia took place in coastal waters off the coast of Syria on 
October 6, 1973. The Israelis were actively patrolling the area with five Saar class fast 
patrol craft. 
Stage 1: The Israeli vessels were detected approximately 30 miles off shore by 
two Syrian picket ships, a torpedo boat and minesweeper, who alerted three Syrian 
missile boats to the east and close inshore. The Israelis engaged and sunk both pickets -
the torpedo boat by 40mm gunfire and the minesweeper with three Gabriel missile hits. 
The Israelis then detected the Syrians to the east at 25 miles. 
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Stage 2: The Israelis turned and closed the Syrians. Shortly thereafter, at 22 
miles, the three Syrians launched a total of eight Styx missiles - all they carried - at the 
closing Israeli force. The Israelis deceived all missiles by softkill anti-missile measures 
and continued to close. The Israelis engaged the three Syrian patrol craft with their 
Gabriel missiles at 12 miles. One Komar and one Osa were sunk and a second Komar 
was hit and ran aground. 
Stage 3: The grounded Komar was then closed and destroyed by 40mm gunfire. 
In summary, eleven Gabriel missiles were launched with six hitting. Eight longer range 
Styx missiles were launched first by the Syrians with no hits. 
This battle serves as a potent illustration of how interrelated tactics, doctrine, and 
effective training can effectively prepare a force for battle. It also shows how the anti-
ship cruise missile advantage of the Syrians lulled them into carelessness, and the absence 
of well thought out combat doctrine. Ultimately, the Israeli Navy's desire to achieve 
surprise, generated by early detection and identification, and plan to saturate the enemy 
with sheer numbers of patrol craft and missiles was transformed from a concept into 
success, even though the details of the plan had to be adopted to the circumstances of the 
engagement. 
5. Summary 
The Israeli example is an oversimplification of the many issues which the U.S. 
Surface Navy now faces. However, it shows the payoff of sound tactics, doctrine and 
training. We need to develop and implement these measures to gain proficiency in 
operations to control littoral areas and support land operations from the sea. 
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B. PART II 
1. Introduction 
The following recommendations are provided to better prepare U.S. naval forces 
for operations within littoral regions throughout the world. They provide a basis for 
fighting near land. The framework stresses simplicity, because otherwise the complex and 
dynamic nature of battle within the confines of the littoral will overwhelm the tactical 
commander and his forces. It is recognized that research and development programs are 
already underway in some of these areas to enhance the capabilities of naval forces for 
future littoral warfare, but these programs could take years before they transition from 
concept to reality. The following recommendations are based on the premise that the 
U.S. Navy must be able to win with forces at its disposal in a battle of the near future. 
The recommendations are the personal views of the author and are not to be taken 
as proven for combat within the littoral environment. Rather, it is hoped that these words 
will initiate thought and sound tactical debate throughout the fleet so that a concerted 
effort can be launched to develop the tactics, doctrines and training requirements to better 
prepare naval forces for operations near land. 
2. Recommendations Aimed to Initiate Sound Tactical Development 
• Ensure there is a shared belief throughout the Navy that future conflict will take 
place under the constraints of the littoral environment. 
The paradigm shift from open ocean operations to operations near land, which we 
now see in the U.S. Navy, is not an anomaly. The study of maritime history reveals that 
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the most common employment of navies has been the support of operations ashore, the 
landing of forces, and the protection of shipping at sea [Ref. 20]. 
In fact, a review of the period of confrontation with the Soviet Union, roughly 
1950-1990, shows that there is a dichotomy between U.S. Navy strategy and actual force 
employment. Maritime strategy during this time frame was developed to gain sea 
control, support a major war in Europe, and attack the Soviet homeland directly - blue 
water missions. However, the actual employment of American nava~ forces was 
conducted near land in many and varied circumstances throughout the world. Air strikes 
in North Vietnam, cruise missile strikes against Iraq, naval gunfire support in Lebanon, 
amphibious landings in Korea, blockade operations against Cuba, and maritime 
interdiction operations in the Adriatic are just a few examples of such operations [Ref. 
29]. 
Additionally, since the fall of the Soviet Union, regions near coastal areas and 
chokepoints of national and economic interest throughout the world have witnessed 
dramatic increases in nationalism, demographic expansion, and resource competition. 
Potential for conflict within these areas is extremely high. 
• The belief that b'ue water proficiency can be carried unmodified into littoral 
regions is uninformed and baseless. 
Warfare within the confines of the littoral is sharply different from warfare on the 
open-ocean. Despite this fact, there is a belief throughout the U.S. Navy that the blue 
water tactical proficiency can be transferred into the littoral. This is an uninformed 
attitude considering that the weapons, sensors, platforms, and personnel of the Navy-
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optimized and trained for warfare in the open-ocean - are not well suited for such 
operations. 
Exercises at sea should be conducted in the worst congested environment possible 
so that ships get a sense of the traffic density and associated IFF problems encountered in 
such an environment. Furthermore, simulations and tactical team trainers should add 
these conditions into their scenarios. 
• Within the littoral environment, it would be best for the U.S. Navy to revert to 
the tactics of World War II in which forces operate in close mutual defensive 
support while at the same time maintain the capability to deliver precision offensive 
firepower. 
The tactical aim of naval forces in battle is to attack effectively first. This is 
created through superior scouting and command and control procedures. Although the 
warships of the U.S. Surface Fleet have great offensive firepower, they may not always 
have the ability to attack effectively first against the enemy within the littoral 
environment. This is because their scouting ability and command and control efforts are 
diminished by the speed at which events transpire and the confusion created by land 
clutter and the over-abundance of shipping and air traffic. As a result, an ambiguous and . 
unclear tactical picture is produced inhibiting our ability to detect, track, and target ,the 
enemy and thus forestall enemy first attack. While U.S. warships are in the process of 
working through the ambiguous and unclear tactical picture, they will be subject to 
attacks by small combatants and aircraft familiar with the constraints of their home field. 
The aim of an inferior enemy will be to use stealth and surprise to impose 
disproportionate losses on us. 
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In World War II, the U.S. Navy concentrated forces for the purposes of defense 
with fighter aircraft and the massed fire oftheir anti-aircraft guns. By the end of the war, 
their defense was so formidable that the Japanese resorted to suicidal missions-
Kamikaze attacks - to penetrate their defense. After World War II, this tactic was soon 
replaced by dispersed formations designed to conceal warships amidst the vastness of the 
oceans ·and commercial shipping in the face of nuclear weapons at sea. In the 1980s the 
threat of nuclear weapons at sea was largely replaced by missiles with conventional 
warheads. By then tactics had been modified with the development of surface-to-air 
missiles and modem jet fighters equipped with air-to-air missiles. Over the years this 
fleet defense evolved into a layered "defense in depth" to counter air, surface, and sub-
surface launched anti-ship cruise missiles. These blue-water tactics still exist today, but 
they depend on battlespace: conditions of adequate warning and reaction time; conditions 
we have demonstrated are lacking within the littoral environment. Therefore, given the 
conditions of the littoral environment and the unstable tactical situations U.S. warships 
face with the inability to attack effectively first and the susceptibility of taking hits, it 
would be prudent for the Navy to avoid ever exposing single warships to attack. We 
should operate with small numbers of strong, mutually supporting formations that accept 
the constraints of the environment and be prepared to prioritize missions and tasking until 
the enemy forces are crushed. 
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• Surface formations must be tightened. 
Massing for the defense will require formations to collapse, perhaps to ranges 
governed by the maximum range of a warship's point defense weapons. Point defense 
weapons must be free to fire without concern for hitting the other ships of the formation. 
• Establish free-fire zones and procedures. 
Free-fire zones should be established in order to alleviate the need for 
decon:fliction with friendly air and surface units, to prevent fratricide, and reduce the 
danger of surprise attack. The ability to quickly alter these free-fire zones by simple 
tactical signal, depending on a particular threat, should be made easy to do, well 
rehearsed, and conducted swiftly and efficiently. Free-fire zones won't eliminate the 
ambiguities created by neutral aircraft or shipping, but the absence of U.S. forces in these 
zones would make decon:fliction easier and reduce fratricide. 
• Establish defensive support tactics for warships engaged in operations in 
support of activities on land. 
Procedures should be formulated so that a warship is provided with substantial 
defensive support - a consort "riding shotgun" - while engaged in operations to support 
activities on land such as Naval Gunfire Support or Tomahawk strikes. Relieving the 
ship of most of its defensive constraints will allow the ship to concentrate on effective 
offensive support. Tested and ready tactics to screen and defend logistic support ships 
and amphibious forces should also be easily signaled and thoroughly practiced. 
Movement in restricted waters and operations within easy enemy reach from below, on, 
or above the sea imposes the constant burden of readiness. An intense armed 
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reconnaissance effort to uncover and sweep away "hot spots" should be seen as the 
antecedent of inshore operations. 
• Maintain minimum formation speed of at least 10 knots. 
A minimum warship speed of at least 10 knots should be maintained at all times 
of danger, giving the ability to turn fast, unmask batteries, and reduce cross section 
relative to an incoming threat. Ships should never be confined to operate within the 
constraints of a box merely for easy identification. What we know about a patrol station 
the enemy will soon come to know. Ships on fixed station become easy prey for enemy 
submarines, fast patrol craft, land based missiles, and aircraft. 
• Adapt Electronic Warfare procedures for inshore operations. 
A major consequence of a strong defense is that we must radiate radar in active 
search, and so the enemy will certainly be aware of the formation's presence and location. 
Therefore, Electronic Warfare tactics should be developed to detect, track, and target the 
enemy with aggressive radiation. [Ref. 29] 
The use of softkill measures - chaff, decoys, etc. - to defeat incoming missiles is 
effective in combat [Ref. 39]. However, an over-enthusiastic response with these 
measures can do more harm than good. Excessive dumping of chaff within a tight 
formation will most likely lead to radar interference among the warships of the formation. 
Chaff clouds might get between an incoming missile and a radar guided weapon that it is 
attempting to engage. Interactions such as these will make weapon and sensor 
performance uncertain. Lastly, the use of chaff may seduce missiles from one target to 
another. The sinking of the SS Atlantic Conveyor in the Falklands War provides such an 
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example. Two air launched Exocet missiles were fired at HMS Ambuscade who was 
screening the British Fleet. She detected the incoming missiles and launched chaff to 
decoy the missiles. The chaff was successful in seducing the missiles away, but once 
through the chaff cloud the missiles acquired the converted VTOL/helicopter carrier SS 
Atlantic Conveyor. Both missiles locked on and hit. Twelve sailors were killed and the 
ship sank six days later [Ref. 39]. Electronic Warfare tactics to avoid these interactions 
must be developed and trained for. Procedures to optimize the use of softkill measures in 
mutual defense will be a challenge to develop [Ref. 24]. 
• Surface screening forces must perform tasks in an ambiguous tactical 
environment under risky conditions. 
The speed at which events transpire, the clutter created by land on radar, and the 
density of shipping and air traffic within the littoral environment make it difficult for _ 
warships to develop clear tactical pictures and unambiguous situational assessments. 
Plain and simple, the first warships entering littoral waters must deal with the congestion 
and confusion because there is no escaping it! 
To alleviate some of the confusion, not only should a greater emphasis be placed 
on scouting- the process where information about the enemy's position, movements, 
vulnerabilities, strengths and intentions are gathered and disseminated among the force -
but also, tactics to confuse and deceive the enemy should be sought to make his tactical 
picture equally confusing if not worse. 
Aircraft and U A V s are the most capable assets to conduct the mission of scouting. 
However, surface ships must be prepared to do so effectively as well. Failure to identify 
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contacts will require visual identification before attack is authorized. Therefore, visual 
recognition techniques should be developed for aircraft crews and bridge watch teams. 
Surface ships require nighttime visual capability. Remote optical sensors that provide 
this capability are available through commercial-off-the-shelf technologies. On a priority 
basis, these sensors should be purchased and placed high on the mast of surface ships to 
enable sighting at the longest ranges possible. 
• Shallow water ASW proficiency will be essential. Active acoustic search will be 
necessary and requires quite different tactics, formations, and means of prosecuting 
contacts. Airborne assets are preferred over seaborne assets, but require 
unaccustomed patience and use of non-acoustic means for detection. 
Submarine detection and prosecution in shallow and relatively noisy water against 
mostly diesel-electric submarines is extremely difficult. ASW weapons and sensors 
currently found in today's warships- developed for open-ocean operations against 
nuclear-powered submarines- are not very effective in the littoral environment. These 
conclusions were known as far back as 1983 upon examination of the Falklands War, yet 
the U.S. Navy has not developed new tactical doctrine for the circumstance. The Third 
World submarine menace has not been quantitatively great, but new acquisitions and 
developments will soon stress U.S. littoral ASW capabilities, both surface and airborne. 
After performance measurements of ASW sensors and weapons in shallow waters 
have been taken, then new tactical procedures to operate in the littoral environment must 
be formulated and practiced. Until new means are developed, surface ship active sonar 
tactics of the 1960s should be relearned. More importantly, efforts must be developed to 
employ ASW fixed wing aircraft and helicopters to detect, locate, and destroy enemy 
submarines remote from surface platforms using tactics of patience and tenacity. 
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Submarine detection by surface ships in an escort role will continue to be important, but 
the enemy will gain first detection, and prosecution with surface ships will be hazardous. 
Rather, the aim should be to give surface ships new and more effective torpedo evasion 
techniques. Chokepoint ASW operations and tactics with or without passive towed array 
sonars and specialized sonobouy patterns should be mastered. 
• Command structure and Rules of Engagement for operations within the littoral 
environment require review. 
The U.S. Navy has an established command structure for open-ocean operations 
with its Composite Warfare Commander Doctrine. The command structure for 
operations within the littoral environment may require revision due to the condensed 
battlespace. Operational and tactical control issues need to be addressed specifically for 
units engaged in operations in support of the land battle. 
Rules of Engagement (ROE) used for operations in the littoral are extensive. 
They should be reviewed for adequacy and risks against a skillful attacker. ROEs must 
be responsive to the compressed nature of these regions which necessitate quick and 
decisive response to many and varied threats. At the edge of war, operating under ROEs 
seems fraught with difficulty and hazard. 
• Responses to the threat ofweapons of mass destruction must be formulated. 
By the end of the century, perhaps up to a dozen coastal nations could actually 
possess or have the capability to develop weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, 
biological, and chemical. Procedures for continued operations in case they are used are 
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sketchy at best. Tactics should be formulated with initial emphasis on seaborne defense 
of ports, terminals, and beachheads. 
• Tactical coordination is required to clear minefields covered by enemy fire. 
The presence of mines poses serious hazards to seaborne forces and amphibious 
landing forces because they channelize movement of ships and reduce their speed below 
the desired 1 0 knot minimum. Yet minefields must not intimidate naval forces nor 
hamper their efforts to gain control of the littoral arena and access to ports and 
beachheads. Mines will often be encountered where mine countermeasure forces are 
subject to attack. Procedures to clear mines while neutralizing enemy attacks on our 
entire formation do not exist. 
Eliminating mines requires a concerted effort among mine sweeping and clearing 
ships, helicopters, and special operations forces. It must be assumed that the littoral _ 
waters in need of mine clearing operations will often be contested by an opposing force 
because it is a time of great vulnerability. Procedures are required for surface ships to 
cover the mine sweeping forces while they are engaged in clearing operations. Likewise, 
procedures are required for mine sweeping forces to clear channels wide enough so that 
the maneuvers of the escorting ships are not curtailed in such a way that the protector 
becomes the victim. 
3. Transformation From Concept Into Reality 
a. Tactics 
Assuming that the recommendations will initiate intensive thought and 
energetic development throughout the fleet, the next logical step is to transform the ideas 
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into tactical reality. Tactical development will be accomplished through exercises under 
conditions as nearly as possible like those encountered in the littoral environment. 
Efforts to work up tactics in conditions other than those encountered within this 
environment - such as out to sea and clear of shipping lanes, commercial air routes, and 
land - will be futile. Only under cluttered and stressful conditions can the newly 
conceived procedures be extensively tested, reviewed, built upon, and mo~ified. 
Realistic exercises will stimulate competition and new ideas from the bottom up. 
Furthermore, means to quickly formulate, record, and disseminate lessons learned should 
be embraced. With motivation and interest in a better system, tactics will develop of 
themselves; they will quickly grow viable and strong .. 
b. Tactical Doctrine 
The tactics which evolve and become believed next need to be written so 
that a commander can control or indoctrinate his forces before action takes place - much 
like Admiral Nelson. Tactical doctrine, as it is called, should not be written in secret 
manuals or in voluminous detail, but in a clear, concise, and simple fashion so that it can 
easily be distributed, understood and updated if need be. An inshore annex to ATP I, 
specifically for use within littoral regions, should be contrived to incorporate the policies 
and procedures as soon as they have matured. The ATP I inshore annex would provide 
tactical guidance upon which surface forces could take action such as stationing speeds, 
formation compositions, search plans, distributions of fire, and the like that can be 
quickly signaled or taken without signal, for prompt and unified action. [Ref. 40] 
Given the complexities, limited battlespace, and reduced reaction time 
within the littoral environment, harmonious and coordinated effort under the constant 
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pressure and stress of hostilities must be nearly automatic. In the heat of battle, this is an 
impossibility without a comprehensive and practiced plan of action which establishes 
unity amidst chaos. Tactical doctrine provides such guidance. 
c. Training 
Sound tactical doctrine becomes the basis for training and the 
measurement of the achievement of training standards. Training based on these standards 
will be the primary means for improving a force's readiness to fight. Whereas tactics and 
doctrine establish the potential for victory, the skills, experience, and knowledge gained 
through training and education translate this potential into reality. [Ref. 29] 
Training within the school command structure, individual unit training, 
and fleet training for littoral warfare ought to be more standardized than it now is. The 
objective is to ensure that all personnel, the most junior to most senior, are imbued with 
knowledge of and faith in the new tactical doctrine. To effectively operate in the littoral, 
the U.S. Navy must conduct its training within it. This probably requires an expansion of 
training operations overseas in combined operations with friendly navies who are more 
experienced than we with littoral operations. Imagine the difficulties - even the 
feasibility - of exercising warships in Chesapeake Bay or Long Island Sound. Surface 
forces must learn through first hand experience the difficulties of operating in such an 
environment in order that they gain the know-how and confidence required to fight and 
win. 
4. Conclusion 
The recommendations suggested are the author's attempt to provide the impetus 
for tactical, doctrinal and training development for littoral warfare. They are not proven. 
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However, they are submitted with the understanding that well formulated tactics, 
commonly understood tactical doctrine, and effective training for littoral operations will 
ideally unite the minds of those throughout the surface fleet. As shown through the 
Israeli example in Part I of this chapter, their combination will create a synergistic effect 
which will ultimately prepare forces for battle in the littoral arena. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The White Papers " ... From the Sea" and "Forward ... From the Sea" outline clearly 
the vision and strategy the U.S. Navy will carry into the 21 51 Century. They specify the 
continuance of several naval roles and missions such as sea control and maritime 
supremacy, but also call for readiness to conduct naval operations in littoral regions all 
around the world. 
The littoral environment and the potential enemy which may be encountered 
therein impose new demands on U.S. naval forces. Geographical constraints, limited 
battlespace, reduced reaction time to incoming threats, the lethality of enemy weapons, 
ambiguous threat bearings, clutter, congestion, uncertainty, restrictive ROEs, unrealistic 
and unattainable states of readiness, and the eventual degradation of weapon and sensor 
performance equate to increased vulnerabilities for naval forces which operate within 
these areas. 
The U.S. Navy is without question the strongest in the world. No other nation, at 
least in the foreseeable future, can challenge its ability to maintain sea control or threaten 
its maritime superiority. However, given the intricacies of the littoral environment and 
the fact that its warships, aircraft, submarines, and personnel are designed and trained for 
operations on the high seas, it would be an imprudent supposition to assume that these 
seagoing forces can turn their open ocean proficiency to advantage in this setting. 
Research and development programs are underway to enhance the capabilities of 
future naval forces for littoral warfare. These programs could be years away from 
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fruition. Should the Navy be called upon to enter battle close to shore in the near future, 
it must be able to fight with what we have now. The Navy will fight as well or as poorly 
as we are prepared, and that is highly dependent on current tactics, doctrine, and training. 
Tactics and doctrine serve to enhance cohesion, mutual understanding, and 
support, thereby creating the potential to achieve prompt and harmonious action among 
forces in battle. Given the complexities, limited battlespace, and reduced reaction time 
within the littoral environment, having the right tactics is extremely important. With 
sound tactics and doctrine, training and exercises develop skills and instincts required for 
combat. However, examination of the tactics, doctrine, and training which pertain to 
Littoral Warfare indicate that they are clearly lagging within the U.S. Navy Surface Fleet. 
In order to train and gain proficiency in operations to control littoral areas and 
support land operations from the sea, the Navy must develop the tactics first. With broad 
acceptance, the tactics can be recorded and promulgated in written tactical doctrine which 
will ultimately produce unified effort among naval surface forces. The tactics may then 
be evaluated, refined, and practiced until they are second nature. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are the personal view of the author and are not to 
be taken as the proven method by which proficiency and synergy of forces is to be 
obtained within the littoral environment. Rather, the recommendations serve to illustrate 
the kind of fundamental tactical core needed as the basis for specific signals, formations, 
firing plans, Electronic Warfare procedures and other guidance that might form an 
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inshore annex to ATP-1. It is hoped that they will initiate a tactical debate to better 
prepare naval forces for operations near land. 
• Ensure there is a shared belief throughout the Navy that future conflict will take place 
under the constraints of the littoral environment. 
• The belief that blue water proficiency can be carried unmodified into littoral regions 
is uninformed and baseless. 
• Within the littoral environment, it would be best for the U.S. Navy to revert to the 
tactics of World War II in which forces operate in close mutual defensive support 
while at the same time maintain the capability to deliver precision offensive 
firepower. 
• Surface formations must be tightened. 
• Establish free-fire zones and procedures. 
• Establish defensive support tactics for warships engaged in operations in support of 
activities on land. 
• Maintain minimum formation speed of at least 1 0 knots. 
• Adapt Electronic Warfare procedures for inshore operations. 
• Surface screening forces must perform tasks in an ambiguous tactical environment 
under risky conditions. 
• Shallow water ASW proficiency will be essential. Active acoustic search will be 
necessary and requires quite different tactics, formations, and means of prosecuting 
contacts. Airborne assets are preferred over seaborne assets, but require 
unaccustomed patience and use of non-acoustic means for detection. 
• Command structure and Rules of Engagement for operations within the littoral 
environment require review. 
• Responses to the threat of weapons of mass destruction must be formulated. 
• Tactical coordination is required to clear minefields covered by enemy fire. 
• To effectively operate in the littoral, the U.S. Navy must conduct its training in it. 
Exercises must be conducted in the most congested environment possible. 
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The author suggests that leadership for this tactical development process rests 
upon the Commanders of Second and Third Fleet in close coordination with the Atlantic 
and Pacific Tactical Training Groups and the Naval Doctrine Command. Inshore tactical 
doctrine should be sponsored and overseen by the Naval Doctrine Command. And lastly, 
responsibility for standardized training based upon tactical doctrine for littoral operations 
rests with the Chief of Naval Education and Training and fleet schools, with advice and 
close coordination with Second and Third Fleets, the Atlantic and Pacific Tactical 
Training Groups, and the Naval Doctrine Command. 
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